

9 January 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Warning Working Group Members

SUBJECT : Agenda for [] Conference []

1. Wednesday evening:

-- General Discussion of the SWS

2. Thursday morning:

-- SWS II (The paper for this is the one prepared under [] chairmanship and distributed in December.)

-- Production strategy for NIT II.1. (Paper is attached to this memorandum.)

3. Thursday afternoon:

-- Continuation of first two items, is necessary.

-- What should be the relationship of the Working Group to WISP?

-- The problem of crisis management. (I have some initial guidance from the DCI and believe some general discussion is in order.)

-- Miscellaneous matters. The floor will be open for any topic anyone wishes to raise.

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Attachment

Distribution:

- 1 - WWG Members
- ① - Warning Working Group File
- 1 - NIO/W Chrono
- 1 - NFAC Registry

DNOWGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
ATTACHMENT

PRODUCTION STRATEGYII. The USSR and Eastern Europe 25X

1. How much warning of an attack can the United States expect? To what extent are Soviet active and passive measures likely to degrade warning? 25X

1. This topic can be restated as two subtopics: 25X

- How much warning time (weeks/days/hours) can be expected prior to an attack by the Soviet Union (Warsaw Pact) against NATO forces in Europe (theater attack) or the United States (strategic attack)? X1
- What are the active and passive cover, concealment and deception measures employed or likely to be employed by the Soviets (Pact) prior to an attack and what effect do they have or could they have on the ability of US intelligence agencies to provide warning? X1

2. Warning Time

- 2a. In progress. DIA with the assistance of the Community is testing the Warning Improvement Study and Plan (WISP) analytical model in partial fulfillment of the NIT. The model only includes data on a specific Soviet exercise involving both naval and long-range aviation forces. At this time, however, apparent software or other malfunction prevented the full testing of the model. Once this hurdle is overcome, WISP will be eventually wired into the still incomplete NMIC Support System PDP 11 terminals for analysts use in the Alert Center. WISP is programmed to give analysts multiple I&W outcome levels for more timely judgments on crisis situations vis-a-vis the USSR. 25X

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2b. Recommended:

- A program of research leading to the issuance of a Memo to Holders of NIE 4-1-78 in 1980. I believe we should discuss on Thursday the topics that should be researched. If we accept the conclusions of NIE 4-1, what work is needed to give greater confidence to the customers?
- A study on Soviet doctrine and capabilities for surprise nuclear attack on the United States. What would be the risks as well as the advantages to the USSR of a course? This question is taken more seriously outside the Community than inside. I believe some work should be done on it, perhaps leading to a Community assessment in late 1979 to 1980.

3. Concealment and Deception. What are we really interested in? Primarily, we are after deception: deliberate attempts to mislead us as to Soviet military/political intentions and military capabilities. This would include concealment only when concealment is intended to convey a false impression rather than simply to deny information. Thus, concealing the presence of a military formation in one place while creating the impression that it is in another belongs under a C&D heading; the inexorable improvement of Soviet security across the board, while of utmost concern, does not. Among the specific problems to be worried about under such a definition are:

- Measures to mislead regarding R&D successes.
- Measures to conceal mobilization or to effect creeping mobilization.
- Diplomatic/propaganda campaigns designed to buy time while diplomatic/military initiatives are carried out.
- Cheating on arms control agreements.
- Methods of misleading opposing commanders in wartime. (Note that Soviet capabilities in this field are an appropriate subject for national intelligence; detection of attempts would be a tactical military responsibility.

4. A Recommended Program:

- X1
- Soviet concepts and capabilities for C&D. (Stated in NIO/SP's strategy paper of 26 September as "The Objectives and Potential Military Effectiveness of Soviet and Warsaw Pact Cover, Concealment, and Deception." "A Survey of Warsaw Pact Concealment, Deception and Intelligence Denial Activity," produced under the aegis of NIO/CF by the C&D WG, will be issued in early January and should provide a basis for this study.)
 - Vulnerability of the NIE 4-1-78 scenarios to Warsaw Pact C&D. A reexamination of these scenarios is probably the most immediate need, but should be preceded by a study of the capabilities of the USSR for "creeping mobilization" and the susceptibility of Western intelligence collection and analysis to Soviet deception techniques.
 - Soviet Concepts and Capabilities for Crisis Management. Such a project is much larger than C&D. It would require collaboration among NIO/SP, NIO/CF, NIO/USSR-EE, and NIO/W.
 - Soviet I&W. Building block for the above (underway in OSR).
- 25X

X1

X1

5. We also need to discuss organization of the Community effort. For instance, the Warning Working Group is responsible for a strategy in support of the NIT. The subject of C&D is much broader than just warning. Where does our responsibility stop? Should there be some other Community coordinating mechanism?

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